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EXPERIMENTAL AUCTION PROCEDURE:I MPACT ON
VALUATION OF QUALITY DIFFERENTIATED GOODS
JAYSON L. LUSK,T Y FELDKAMP, AND TED C. SCHROEDER
Despite increased use of experimental auctions, a myriad of different procedures are being employed
without formal consideration of how the procedures might affect results. This study investigates the
effect of several procedural issues on valuation estimates from experimental auctions. Results indi-
cate the second price auction generates higher valuations than English, Becker–DeGroot–Marschak
(BDM), and random nth price auctions, especially in latter bidding rounds, and that random nth price
auction yields lower valuations than English and BDM auctions. We ﬁnd that endowing subjects with
a good prior to eliciting bids can have an impact on valuations, but the effect varies across auction
mechanism.
Key words: BDM, endowment effect, English auction, random nth price auction, Vickrey second price
auction.
In an era of rising product differentiation,
where producers, processors, and retailers are
attemptingto“addvalue”toagriculturalprod-
ucts, experimental economics are playing an
increasingly important role in estimating new
product premiums and targeting novel and
safer foods to speciﬁc consumer segments. For
example,inrecentyearsexperimentalauctions
have been used to estimate consumer demand
for irradiated pork and chicken, non-bovine
somatotropinmilk,insecticidereductioninap-
ples, steak tenderness, beef packaging, and
nongenetically modiﬁed corn chips (Fox; Fox
et al.; Hoffman et al.; Lusk et al. 2001a, 2001b;
Roosen et al.; Shogren, List, and Hayes). Ex-
perimental methods are becoming more com-
monplace in nonmarket valuation because of
perceived beneﬁts relative to previously used
contingentvaluationsurveymethods.Because
real products and real money are exchanged
in an experimental setting, participants have
more incentive to reveal their true value for a
product than in a hypothetical survey setting
(e.g., Cummings, Harrison, and Rutsr¨ om; Fox
et al.; List and Shogren 1998). Further, exper-
iments place subjects in an active market en-
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vironment, where they can learn and adjust to
market conditions.
Although the use of experimental auctions
has increased in recent years, applications re-
lated to product marketing, pricing, and adop-
tionhavegenerallybeenlimitedtotheagricul-
tural economics literature (e.g., Buzby et al.;
Fox; Fox et al.; Hayes et al.; Lusk et al. 2001a,
2001b; Melton et al.; Roosen et al.; Shogren,
List, and Hayes). A few studies have used ex-
perimental auctions in the marketing litera-
ture (e.g., Hoffman et al., Wertenbroch and
Skiera), but applications are still rare.1 As ex-
perimentalmethodsgainacceptanceasavalu-
abletoolinmarketresearch,thereliabilityand
consistency of value estimates needs careful
assessment.
Even a casual review of the existing litera-
turerevealsthatpreviousexperimentalstudies
have employed a wide variety of techniques
and procedures to elicit willingness-to-pay
(WTP) for novel products. One of the most
noticeabledifferencesacrossstudiesistheauc-
tion mechanism used to elicit WTP. For exam-
ple, the following mechanisms have been em-
ployedintherecentliterature:Vickreysecond
price, ascending-bid second price, random nth
price, ﬁrst price, ﬁfth price, Becker–DeGroot–
Marschak(BDM),English,andcombinatorial
private-collective auctions (Lusk et al. 2001a,
1 Of course, experimental auctions are used extensively in the
general economics literature, but applications mostly involve tests
ofeconomictheoryratherthanusingvaluationstomakemarketing
or product adoption decisions.
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2001b; Melton et al.; Rutstr¨ om; Shogren et al.
1994). Previous research also differs on how
many goods are valued in a particular ex-
perimental session. Some research only val-
ued a single product characteristic (e.g., Lusk
et al. 2001b), while other studies had subjects
value multiple characteristics or goods simul-
taneously (e.g., Roosen et al., Melton et al.).
Another notable difference in previous stud-
ies is the procedure used to elicit demand for
the novel product. In many studies, subjects
are endowed with a good and are asked how
muchtheywouldbewillingtopaytoexchange
their endowed good for a similar good with a
slightly different characteristic (e.g., Hayes et
al.). In contrast, other researchers simply have
subjects bid full value for a novel good (e.g.,
Melton et al., Rutstr¨ om).
Obviously, consensus does not exist on spe-
ciﬁc procedures to employ when valuing novel
products.Ifvaluationestimatesvaryacrossdif-
ferent procedures, one must question the reli-
ability of speciﬁc value estimates. Under cer-
tainassumptions,valuationswillbeequivalent
under all the different procedures discussed
above. However, it is unlikely that all the nec-
essary assumptions will hold in practice, and
previousresearchsuggeststhatvaluationsvary
by auction mechanism and procedure (e.g.,
Rutstr¨ om).Theprimarypurposeofthisarticle
is to determine the stability of WTP estimates
across a variety of changes in experimental
procedure. The need for such a study has re-
centlybeennotedbyShogrenetal.(2002),who
inarecentsummaryofoveradecadeoflabval-
uation concluded (p. 21), “Subtle changes in
experimental procedures...signiﬁcantly im-
pact the results...[O]ur experience leads us
to conclude that over time, and as designs are
reﬁned, improved reality-based consumer ex-
periments will become an important method
for analyzing the demand side of food safety.”
The goal of this article is to directly test
the following assumptions typically held in
experimental valuation work: (a) valuations
are equivalent across theoretically incentive
compatible auctions, (b) valuations are not
reference-dependent, and (c) valuations are
insensitive to the number of goods being val-
ued. Because this research focuses on elicit-
ing “homegrown values”—those values con-
sumers bring into an experiment—we cannot
saywhichprocedureormethodelicitsthemost
“correct” WTP estimates. However, this re-
searchcanprovideinsightbyrevealinghowthe
relative magnitudes of valuation estimates are
affected by various approaches, which might
improve pricing, product adoption, and policy
decisions.
Background
We consider three procedural issues in ex-
perimental valuation: auction mechanism,
reference-dependent preferences, and the
number of goods valued. Each of these issues
is important and has the potential to inﬂuence
WTP estimates in a variety of ways. Previ-
ous research, especially with regard to auction
mechanisms, has suggested that WTP valua-
tions are affected by procedure, but no study
has considered the breadth of procedural top-
ics addressed here. First, a review of the lit-
erature associated with each of the issues is
presented.
Auction Mechanism
Oneofthemostimportanttasksinimplement-
ing an experimental auction is the decision of
which mechanism to employ. The most impor-
tant factor to consider in this regard is the
incentive compatibility of the auction mech-
anism. An auction mechanism is considered
theoretically incentive compatible if an indi-
vidual’s dominant strategy is to bid in such a
mannerthatvaluationsaretruthfullyrevealed.
Even when this factor is taken into considera-
tion, a number of options remain.
We focus on four auctions commonly used
in the literature that are theoretically incen-
tive compatible: the second price, random nth
price, BDM, and English auctions. The struc-
ture of each of these elicitation mechanisms
is outlined in table 1. Of the auctions listed
in table 1, the English auction is perhaps the
mostwidelyrecognized.InanEnglishauction,
the auctioneer (experimenter) opens the auc-
tion at a relatively low price. Depending upon
thesetupoftheauction,competitorseitherof-
fer ascending bids or signal their willingness
to stay in the auction as prices are increased
over time. The auction ends when only one
participant is willing to pay the current price.
This individual wins the auction and pays the
last price offered. Vickrey proposed the sec-
ond price auction as a sealed-bid equivalent to
the English auction. In a second price auction,
competitorssimultaneouslysubmitsealedbids
for a good. The individual with the highest bid
wins the auction and pays the second highest
bid amount for the good. Notable alternatives
to the English and second price auctions are
the BDM and random nth price auctions.Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder Experimental Auction Procedures 391
Table 1. Incentive Compatible Auctions
Auction Institution
Second Random
Price nth Price English BDM
Participant
procedure
Simultaneously
submit sealed
bids
Simultaneously
submit sealed
bids
Sequentially offer
ascending bids
Simultaneously
submit sealed
bids
Winning bidder Participant with
highest bid
All participants
with bid greater
than a randomly
drawn (nth) bid
Participant who
offers the last
bid
All participants
with bid greater
than a randomly
drawn price
Number of winners 1 n − 1 1 0 to all participants
Market price Second highest bid nth highest bid Last bid offered Randomly drawn
price
Market feedback? Yes, with multiple
rounds
Yes, with multiple
rounds
Yes No
References Vickrey, Shogren
et al. (2001b)
Shogren et al.
(2001b)
Vickrey;
Coppinger,
Smith, and Titus
Becker, DeGroot,
and Marschak;
Irwin et al.
Becker,DeGroot,andMarschakintroduced
the BDM mechanism as a way to induce in-
dividuals to truthfully reveal certainty equiv-
alents for lotteries. In the BDM elicitation
procedure, subjects individually submit sealed
bids for a good. A random number or price
is then drawn from a prespeciﬁed distribu-
tion. Individuals with bids greater than the
randomly drawn price “win” the auction and
purchase a unit of the good at the randomly
drawn price. More recently, Shogren et al.
(2001b) formally introduced the random nth
price auction, which theoretically combines
the best features of second price and BDM
elicitation mechanisms by engaging every po-
tential bidder and using an endogenously de-
termined market price. In the random nth
priceauction,competitorssimultaneouslysub-
mit sealed bids for a good. Then one bid (the
nth bid) is drawn from the sample of com-
petitors. Individuals with bids greater than the
nth bid win the auction and purchase one
unit of the good at a price equal to the nth
bid.
Formal discussions of incentive compatibil-
ity properties of the auctions are provided by
Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak, Irwin et al.,
Shogren et al. (2001b), and Vickrey. Despite
theoretical equivalence between the four auc-
tions, empirical studies suggest behavior can
diverge.Severalstudieshavecomparedsecond
price and English auction bids using induced
values.Coppinger,Smith,andTitusfoundthat
bids in English and second price auctions were
similar and that both auctions produced bids
neartheoreticallypredictedvalues.2 However,
Kagel, Harstad, and Levin and Kagel and
Levin found a tendency for both experienced
and inexperienced participants to “overbid”
in second price auctions. Second price auc-
tions either required several repeated trials to
converge to the predicted theoretical value, or
never converged at all. Shogren et al. (2001b)
found, in an induced value setting, that sec-
ond and random nth price auctions were both
demand revealing in aggregate, but the ran-
dom nth (second) price auction worked bet-
ter for off-margin (on-margin) bidders than
the second (random nth) price auction. Irwin
et al. conducted an induced value study with
the BDM mechanism and concluded that sub-
jectsbidconsistentwiththedominantdemand
revealing strategy.
Differences might arise between incentive
compatible auctions in a homegrown value
setting, where preferences are not induced,
because of bidder afﬁliation (Milgrom and
Weber). Strategic equivalence between auc-
tions requires that rivals’ valuations are in-
dependent (i.e., nonafﬁliated). In homegrown
value auctions, where the good is unfamiliar
and information is asymmetric, this condition
may not hold. Afﬁliation might be expected to
occur in English auctions, where subjects have
large amounts of public information about
other individuals’ valuations or in repeated
2 A weakness of the Coppinger, Smith, and Titus study is that
subjects were not allowed to bid greater than induced value.392 May 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
second or nth price auctions, where market
prices are posted after each round (List and
Shogren 1999). Of interest in this application
are the behavioral differences that arise be-
tweenincentivecompatibleauctions,whenthe
valuation context is moved out of the induced
value setting and into the arena of real, pri-
vate goods, where some degree of uncertainty
and afﬁliation can almost always be expected
to exist.
A few studies have compared homegrown
valuations across competing incentive com-
patible auctions. Rutstr¨ om found that English
and BDM bids were signiﬁcantly lower than
bids from a second price auction. In con-
trast, Lucking-Reiley found that revenues
from English and second price auctions were
not statistically different in Internet auctions.
Shogren et al. (1994) did not ﬁnd a statistical
difference between second price and random
nth price auction bids, but List (2003) found
that random nth price bids were signiﬁcantly
greater than second price bids, especially at
lower tails of the bid distribution.
Clearly, only a few studies have compared
homegrown valuations across different the-
oretically incentive compatible auctions. Of
the comparisons that have been performed,
there is some disagreement. For examples, (a)
Rutstr¨ omfoundsecondpricebidsweregreater
than English bids, but this result was not con-
ﬁrmed by Lucking-Reiley and (b) List (2003)
found a signiﬁcant difference between second
price and random nth price, but Shogren et al.
(1994) did not. To our knowledge, no previ-
ous study has compared valuations across all
four auctions considered here. In the follow-
ing experiment, we seek to test the following
hypothesis:
H0: WTPsecondprice = WTPrandonnthprice
= WTPBDM
= WTPEnglish.
(1)
Importantly, a rejection of the above hypoth-
esis does not imply that one of the auctions is
not incentive compatible. This fact can only be
ascertained in an induced value setting where
truevaluesareknown.Whatwecanlearnfrom
testing the hypothesis is how we might expect
valuations, and thus pricing and product adop-
tion recommendations, to differ when alterna-
tive auction mechanisms are employed.
Reference-Dependent Preferences
Another procedural factor to consider in
implementing an experimental auction is
whether to endow participants with a good
prior to the elicitation task. Many studies en-
dow subjects with a good and elicit WTP to
upgrade to a “higher quality” good. The ad-
vantageoftheendowmentisthatitisolatesthe
effect of interest and mitigates other outside-
marketinﬂuences.Foxhasalsoarguedthaten-
dowing subjects with a good forces subjects to
participate and pay attention to the auction
and bids they make. Some studies go so far
as to impose a consumption-requirement—a
requirement that subjects consume the food
they end the experiment with (e.g., Fox, Hayes
et al.). Further support for the endowment ap-
proachisgivenbyHoffmanetal.,whocontend
themostusefulandreliableestimatesfromex-
perimentalauctionsaredifferencesinWTPbe-
tween two goods. The endowment approach
directly elicits this difference. As illustrated
by Lusk et al. (2001b), the endowment ap-
proach can also be helpful in attracting partic-
ipants in a ﬁeld setting such as a grocery store.
Ratherthanpayingsubjectstoattendalabora-
torysetting,whichhasbeenshowntoinﬂuence
valuations (Rutstr¨ om), subjects can be given
a lower quality good for participation and
WTP for a higher quality good can be elicited.
Such an approach removes the confound-
ing effects of necessarily high participation
fees.
Despite advantages of the endowment ap-
proach, it may introduce bias in WTP esti-
mates. Tversky and Kahneman suggest that
valuations may be reference dependent. One
manifestation of reference dependent valua-
tion is that individuals might place greater
valueonagoodiftheypossessitthaniftheydo
not, an effect that is thought to arise from loss
aversion: where losses are valued more highly
than gains.
If the reference-dependent preferences ex-
ist then value estimates for a novel product
or attribute depend upon the subjects’ ini-
tial reference point—whether or not they ini-
tially possess the good. We will determine
whether reference-dependent preferences in-
ﬂuence WTP in the context routinely em-
ployed in valuing novel goods and attributes.
Inan“Endowment”treatment,subjectswillbe
given(endowed)onefreegood(goodA).Sub-
jects then bid to exchange good A for another
good (good B). Refer to this bid as WTPAB.
In another “No Endowment” treatment, sub-
jects directly bid to obtain goods A and B.
Refer to each of these bids as WTPA and
WTPB, respectively. To determine whether
reference-dependentpreferencesexist,wetest
the hypothesis:Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder Experimental Auction Procedures 393
H0: WTPAB = WTPB − WTPA (2)
If WTPAB < WTPB − WTPA, then the sub-
jects valued good A relatively more highly
when it was in their possession than when they
bid to obtain it. Previous research examining
differences in WTP and willingness-to-accept
suggests a potential interaction between the
endowment effect and elicitation mechanism
(Shogren et al. 2001a; Knetsch, Tang, and
Thaler). Thus, we carry out the test of above
hypothesis with all four auctions previously
discussed.
Multiple-Good Valuation
Previousstudiesdifferonthenumberofgoods
subjects are asked to evaluate in an auction.
Eliciting the value for only one good or at-
tribute is clearly the most straightforward ap-
proach (e.g., Lusk et al. 2001b); however, re-
searchers are often interested in a variety of
product designs or a number of different de-
scriptions of a product or attribute. In such
cases, it becomes advantageous to have con-
sumers evaluate multiple alternatives (e.g.,
Melton et al.). When conducting an experi-
ment, there is a relatively high degree of ﬁxed
costs associated recruiting subjects and con-
ducting an experimental session. A clear ad-
vantage of multi-good versus single-good val-
uation is that the researcher can get more data
for little additional cost.
Despite advantages of multiple-good valu-
ation, there are disadvantages. First and fore-
most,iftheexperimentaldesignisnotproperly
constructed, valuations will be affected by de-
mand reduction or wealth effects. That is, if a
subject purchases a good in one treatment of
anexperiment,theirdemandforthenextgood
willlikelyfallinasubsequenttreatmentdueto
a movement along the demand curve, not nec-
essarily due to a treatment effect. Fortunately,
this problem can be easily corrected by ran-
domly selecting a binding round or treatment,
where subjects know a priori that only one
good will be purchased. For example, Hayes
etal.randomlyselectedonlyoneoftwentybid-
ding rounds as binding. With a random draw-
ing determining the binding round, subjects
shouldbehaveoptimallyineachround,solong
as it is assumed that subjects’ expected util-
ity is linear in probabilities. Roosen et al. pro-
vide evidence that this assumption is not too
tenuous.
Anotherdisadvantageofmultiple-goodval-
uation is that valuation for one good may be
alteredbypresentingtheoptionofotheravail-
ablesubstitutes.Forexample,subjectsmaybe-
lieve a guaranteed tender steak is valuable
when considered in isolation but may place
a different value on the guaranteed tender
steakwhentheyknowaCertiﬁedAngusBeef

(CAB) steak is also available. List (2002) re-
cently showed that valuations signiﬁcantly dif-
fered depending upon whether goods were
viewed in isolation or whether they were jux-
taposed.SimonsonandSimonsonandTversky
have also shown that consumer choice can be
signiﬁcantlyinﬂuencedbythealternativeswith
which a product is compared. Although neo-
classical economic theory cannot account for
such effects, it remains an empirical matter as
towhethersubjects’valuationsareinvariantto
the number of goods auctioned. Using the no-
tation introduced in the previous subsection,
we test the following hypothesis:
(WTPAin isolation)
= (WTPA when A is simultaneously
auctioned with good B).
(3)
Application
Consumers were asked to evaluate several
different types of beef ribeye steaks. Beef
industry participants are beginning to pro-
mote programs to enhance demand through
introducinginformationaboutproductquality
throughbrandsorlabels.However,thereisun-
certaintyassociatedwithwhichstrategyshould
be pursued (see Lusk for a discussion of this
issue). As such, we evaluate consumer prefer-
ences for several types of beef steaks that ei-
ther could be used to differentiate and brand
beef or are already being used to market beef.
In this study, subjects were asked to evaluate
ﬁve different steaks: generic, guaranteed ten-
der,“natural,”U.S.DepartmentofAgriculture
(USDA) Choice, and CAB. An information
sheetwasgiventoexperimentparticipantsthat
described each steak. Several studies have an-
alyzed consumer demand for some of these
types of beef steaks (e.g., Lusk et al. 2001a,
2001b; Lusk, Roosen, and Fox), but none have
jointly considered all of these steak types. In
the local market analyzed in this study, only
the generic steak was available for sale in all
grocery outlets, with Choice and CAB selling
in one chain. Thus, most of these products are
novel goods in that most consumers cannot
purchase them in the local market. Even in
cases where subjects can buy generic, Choice,394 May 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
Table 2. Experimental Treatments
Auction Institution
Second Random
Procedure Price nth Price English BDM
Endowment—ﬁve goods Vic-E Nth-E Eng-E BDM-E
No Endowment—ﬁve goods Vic-NE Nth-NE Eng-NE BDM-NE
No Endowment—two goods Vic-NE2 –––
and CAB, for example, there are not other al-
ternatives available such that relative demand
foreachofthesteakscanbedirectlycompared.
Our research design allows us to analyze de-
mand for these novel steaks relative to pre-
existing substitutes.
Experiment Design and Methods
To evaluate the effect of procedural features
on WTP estimates, we constructed nine ex-
perimental treatments as shown in table 2.
In the Endowment treatments, subjects were
given a free 12 oz ribeye steak that was
“generic.” Beyond the fact that subjects were
told the generic steak was USDA federally
inspected, no other guarantees were given
regarding the quality of the meat. In the
Endowment treatments, subjects bid to ex-
change their generic steak for each of the fol-
lowingfoursteaks:guaranteedtender,natural,
USDA Choice, and CAB. As shown in table 2,
we used the Endowment procedure in four
auctions: Vickrey second price, random nth
price,BDM,andEnglish.Thesetreatmentsare
denoted Vic-E, Nth-E, BDM-E, and Eng-E,
respectively.
In a second set of No Endowment treat-
ments,subjectswerenotgivenanysteak.Inthe
No Endowment treatments, subjects directly
bid on each of the ﬁve steaks: generic, guaran-
teed tender, natural, USDA Choice, and CAB
in each of the four auctions: Vickrey second
price, random nth price, BDM, and English.
These treatments are denoted Vic-NE, Nth-
NE, BDM-NE, and Eng-NE, respectively, as
shown in table 2. Lastly, another treatment
was constructed where subjects were not en-
dowed with any good, and they only bid on
thegenericandguaranteedtendersteaks.This
is the No Endowment—two-good treatment
denoted Vic-NE2.
To test the hypothesis outlined in equa-
tion (2), we calculate the differences between
the generic steak bids and bids for all other
steak in the No Endowment treatment. For
easeofexposition,refertothegenericsteakas
goodA,theguaranteedtendersteakasgoodB,
thenaturalsteakasgoodC,theUSDAChoice
steakasgoodD,andtheCABsteakasgoodE.
IntheEndowmenttreatment,eachsubjectwas
endowed with good A and we elicited WTP to
exchange good A for each of other four goods,
which we refer to as WTPAi, where i = B, C,
D, and E. In the other No Endowment treat-
ment, subjects directly bid to obtain each of
the ﬁve goods. We refer to each of these bids
asWTPj,wherej=A,B,C,D,andE.Todeter-
mine whether the endowment effect exists, we
compare WTPAi with WTPj − WTPA for j =
B,C,D,andE.3 WerefertotheWTPj −WTPA
calculations as the “implied differences” from
the No Endowment treatment.
Participant Recruitment
To test the consistency of WTP across treat-
ments, individuals were recruited from the
general population of a midwestern college
town using random digit dialing techniques.
Subjects were offered $40 cash to participate
in a “steak preference experiment,” to be con-
ducted in the meat laboratory on the local uni-
versity campus. Individuals that agreed to par-
ticipate were assigned a time and date that
was convenient for them. Conﬁrmation letters
were mailed to participants one week prior
to the sessions to increase attendance rates.
We held at least two sessions for each of the
treatments outlined in table 2 and approxi-
matelytwentysubjectswererecruitedforeach
session. The goal was to obtain about forty
observations per treatment. Upon arriving at
the session, subjects were paid $40 cash and
completedashortdemographicquestionnaire.
Subjects were then provided an opportunity
to closely examine ﬁve different beef ribeye
steaks: a generic steak, a guaranteed tender
3 By construction of the test, WTPAi is restricted to be nonnega-
tive. To ensure comparability, if WTPi – WTPA is calculated to be
lessthanzero,thenwerestrictthevaluetobeequaltozero.Across
all steaks and auctions, only 4% of differences were less than zero.Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder Experimental Auction Procedures 395
steak, a natural steak, a USDA Choice steak,
and a CAB steak.
Importantly, no subject was allowed to par-
ticipate in more than one session. That is,
all tests reported in this paper are between-
subject tests. Although there are advantages
to within-subject tests, we felt that a within-
subject experiment would be too time inten-
sive relative to the level of compensation paid
to participants.4 Further, participation in an
Endowment treatment, for example, would al-
most certainly affect behavior in a subsequent
No Endowment treatment, thus drastically in-
creasing the number of treatments required to
identify an order effect in a within-subject de-
sign. The assumption in our between-subject
design is that the distribution of steak prefer-
encesisequivalentacrosstreatments.Insubse-
quentanalysis,weexplicitlytestandcontrolfor
differencesindemographicsacrosstreatments
prior to drawing any conclusions.
Auction Procedures
Subjects were randomly assigned to a particu-
lar treatment. After completing the question-
naire, consumers participated in a nonhypo-
theticalauctionforseveraldifferentcandybars
to familiarize them with the procedures. The
candy bar auctions were design to mimic the
steak auctions to facilitate the learning pro-
cess. Following the candy bar auction, con-
sumers participated in an auction for the beef
steaks.
The following outlines the procedures for
thesecondpriceandrandomnthpriceauctions
in the No Endowment treatments. The pro-
cedures for the Endowment treatments were
identicaltothatoutlinedbelowexceptsubjects
bid to exchange a generic steak for the other
four steaks and they necessarily took at least
one steak-type home.
Step 1: Each subject simultaneously sub-
mitted ﬁve sealed bids for each of the fol-
lowingsteaks:generic,guaranteedtender,
natural, USDA Choice, and CAB.
Step 2: The allocation rule of the partic-
ular auction (see table 1) was used to
determine the winning bidder(s) and the
market prices for each of the steaks. The
winning bidder number(s) and market
prices for each of the steaks were posted
in the front of the room.
4 Even with our between-subject design, several experimental
sessions lasted as long as ninety minutes.
Step 3: Steps 1 and 2 were repeated for
fouradditionalrounds.Atthecompletion
of the ﬁfth round, one of the ﬁve rounds
was randomly selected as binding.
Step 4: A random drawing commenced to
determine which of the ﬁve steaks was
binding.
Step 5: The winning bidder(s) of the ran-
domly selected steak in the randomly se-
lectedroundpaidthemarketpriceforthe
steak. All other participants paid nothing
and received no steak.
The procedures for the BDM mechanism
were identical to that described above, ex-
cept step 3 was omitted. That is, the BDM
was a single-shot auction with only one bid-
ding round. We conducted multiple bidding
rounds for the second price and random nth
price auctions because market prices were
endogenously determined and subjects could
incorporate market feedback into their valua-
tions; whereas, for the BDM mechanism, mar-
ket prices were exogenously determined, and
assuch,subjectswouldhavereceivednomean-
ingful feedback from additional rounds.
The structure of the English auction re-
quired a slight alteration in procedure. Con-
ducting multiple rounds is redundant with
the English auction because every individual
openly identiﬁes their bid during the auction.
Further, it was impossible to simultaneously
auction all steaks at once because of the na-
ture of the auction. So, in the English auction
we ﬁrst conducted an auction for the generic
steak. Once the winning bidder and market
price were determined for the generic steak,
we posted this information in the front of
the room. Then the guaranteed tender steak
was auctioned. This process continued until
the winning bidder and market price were de-
termined for each of the ﬁve steaks. That is,
subjects participated in ﬁve sequential auc-
tions: ﬁrst for the generic steak, then for the
guaranteed tender steak, and so on. At the
completion of the ﬁve steak auctions, we ran-
domly selected one auction to be binding.5
Ineachoftheauctions,noindividualpartici-
panthadthechancetopurchasemorethanone
steak. We randomly drew the binding round
in the second and random nth price auction
to control for wealth effects. A binding steak
was randomly drawn in treatments so that we
could elicit demand for a single-unit (see List
5 Instructions for each of the treatments are available from the
authors upon request.396 May 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
and Lucking-Reiley for impacts of demand
reductioninmultiunitauctions).Ineachofthe
auctions,subjectswereexplicitlyinformedthat
it was in their best interest to bid exactly what
each of the goods was worth to them.6
Again,itisimportanttonotethatthesecond
andrandomnthpriceauctionswereconducted
over multiple rounds; whereas, the BDM and
English were single-round auctions. Our ex-
perimental design was implemented in this
manner because: (a) it replicates the way most
practitioners have used these auctions when
valuing novel goods, (b) market prices are en-
dogenously (exogenously) determined in the
second and random nth price (BDM) auctions
andmultiplebiddingrounds(wouldnot)allow
subjects to incorporate market feedback into
their valuations, and (c) every subject openly
identiﬁes their valuation in the English, mak-
ing multiple rounds with this mechanisms re-
dundant. In subsequent analysis, we compare
bids from the English and BDM to bids from
all ﬁve rounds of the second and random nth
price auctions. This approach should provide
insight into relative inﬂuence of the auction
mechanisms versus the impact of market feed-
back on valuations.
Results
Participantswererecruitedasapartofalarger
projectonconsumerdemandforqualitydiffer-
entiated beef. Response rates for the overall
project were as follows: 45% of random digit
dialswereworkingnumbers,48%ofcontacted
individuals agreed to participate in a research
session, and 85% of individuals who agreed to
takepartinasessionactuallyparticipated.One
hundred and nineteen subjects participated in
the No Endowment treatments with 35, 25, 22,
and27subjectsparticipatinginthesecond,ran-
dom nth, English, and BDM auctions, respec-
tively.Another119subjectsparticipatedinthe
Endowment treatments with 31, 29, 31, and
28subjectsparticipatinginthesecond,random
nth, English, and BDM auctions, respectively.
Lastly, another twenty subjects participated in
a No Endowment treatment where only two
goodswerevalued.Thus,atotalof258individ-
uals participated in the experiments reported
in this article.
6 Informing subjects of the dominant strategy in homegrown
value auctions follows “best practices” (e.g., Rutstr¨ om). More im-
portantly, we were interested in determining whether valuations
were consistent across auctions even when subjects were informed
of the dominant strategy, as they would be in most applications.
Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for selected demographic
variablesarereportedintable3.Femalescom-
prised about half the sample and the average
age in each treatment was about thirty-ﬁve
years. Most subjects were either highly edu-
cated or were full time students. The relatively
high education rate and student participation
is reﬂective of the population in the univer-
sity town. Although the sample is not repre-
sentative of the national population, we are
interested in the relative behavior of partici-
pants across treatment. In that regard, we are
concerned with whether the sample makeups
of each treatment are similar. For each of the
demographics reported in table 3, results of
ANOVA tests could not reject the hypothesis
thateachofthedemographicswereequivalent
across treatment. As such, differences in de-
mographics are not likely driving differences
in behavior across treatment.
Auction bids segregated by experimental
treatment and steak type are reported in
tables 4 and 5. Table 4 reports bids from the
ﬁrst round of the second and random nth price
auctions; whereas, table 5 reports bids from
the ﬁfth round of the second and random nth
price auctions. Because the English and BDM
were single-round auctions, valuations asso-
ciated with these elicitation mechanisms are
equivalent in both tables. In the No Endow-
ment treatment (table 4), subjects were will-
ing to pay an average of $2.46 for a 12 oz
generic steak and $3.97 for a 12 oz CAB steak,
for example, in the ﬁrst round of the second
price auction. Data in table 5 show that these
statistics increased to $3.66 and $5.17, respec-
tively, by round ﬁve in the second price auc-
tion. Casual comparison of bids across auc-
tionsintheNoEndowmenttreatmentsuggests
that second price auction bids were roughly
similar to the other mechanisms in round one
(table 4), but were generally greater than
bids in the other three auctions by round ﬁve
(table 5). A similar trend is apparent in the
Endowment treatment as well—second price
bids were greater than random nth, English,
and BDM bids, especially by round ﬁve.
Table 4 also reports implied differences
fromtheNoEndowmenttreatment,whichcan
be directly compared with bids from the En-
dowment treatment. These statistics were cal-
culated by subtracting the bid for the generic
steak from the bids for each of the other
four steaks. For the second price auction, the
average implied differences are less than theLusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder Experimental Auction Procedures 397
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average exchange bids for each of the steaks,
but the opposite is generally the case for
the other three auctions. The last columns in
tables4and5reportbidsfromthesecondprice
auction where only the generic and guaran-
teed tender steaks were auctioned. Compar-
ing these averages with those in the ﬁrst col-
umn suggest little difference in bids when two
versus ﬁve goods were auctioned.
Effect of Auction Institution
To determine whether the auction institu-
tionsigniﬁcantlyinﬂuencedbids,weestimated
three random effects tobit models as shown
in table 6. We estimate tobit models because
of the mass of bids located at $0.00. The to-
bit models were adjusted to incorporate ran-
dom effects to account for the panel nature
of the data—that is, each individual submitted
multiple bids for different steaks in multiple
biding rounds. The tobit model, incorporating
random effects is
biditj =   xitj + vitj + ui,
bidit = max
 
0,bid
∗
itj
 
(4)
where bidit is the auction bid for the ith con-
sumer and the tth steak type (generic, guar-
anteed tender, etc.) in the jth bidding round,
which is observed only at positive levels, xit
is a vector of independent variables includ-
ing dummy variables identifying steak-type,
dummy variables identifying elicitation mech-
anism by bidding round, and demographics,  
is a conformable vector of coefﬁcients, ui is
an individual speciﬁc disturbance for subject
i, and vitj is the overall error term (see Greene
for further discussion on the random effects
tobit).
The ﬁrst column in table 6 reports results
of a model estimated with the No Endowment
data. Results indicate that consumers signiﬁ-
cantly differentiated amongst different steak
types, with the CAB steak being the most de-
sirableandthenaturalsteakbeingtheleastde-
sirable next to the generic steak.7 The primary
resultsofinterestarewithregardtothedummy
variables identifying auction type. Results in-
dicate that bids from the English, BDM, and
7 We do not make any formal attempt to explain why the CAB
steak was the most preferred, whereas the natural and generic
were least preferred. The fact that CAB was most desirable may
be attributable to heavy advertising at the local level, whereas the
relative undesirability of the natural steak may reﬂect the agrarian
background of the locale.
all four rounds of the random nth price auc-
tions were signiﬁcantly less than round 5 sec-
ond price auction bids. In contrast, further
statistical analysis indicates that round 1 sec-
ondpriceauctionbidswerenotstatisticallydif-
ferent than English, BDM, and nth price bids.
Wealsoﬁndthatbidswerenotsigniﬁcantlydif-
ferent across the English and BDM auctions.
Bids were relatively stable across the ﬁve bid-
ding rounds for the random nth price auction,
but bids signiﬁcantly increased from round 1
to round 5 in the second price auction, with
thelargestchangeoccurringbetweenrounds1
and 2.
Table 6 reports similar models for the En-
dowment treatment data. BDM and English
bids were not statistically different than ﬁrst-
round second price auction bids, but were sta-
tistically different than second price auction
bids in rounds 2–5. For the Endowment treat-
ment, random nth price bids, regardless of
round, were signiﬁcantly less than bids from
the English, BDM, and all ﬁve rounds of the
second price auction. As was the case for the
No Endowment treatment, the English and
BDM yielded statistically equivalent results in
the Endowment treatment. Again, bids were
relatively stable across the ﬁve bidding rounds
for the random nth price auction, but bids sig-
niﬁcantly increased from round 1 to round 5
in the second price auction, with the largest
change occurring between rounds 1 and 2.
The remaining results in table 6 pertain to
the test of whether auction mechanism in-
ﬂuenced bids for the implied differences cal-
culated from the No Endowment treatment.
Surprisingly,auctionmechanismhadmuchless
inﬂuence on the differences in bids. Although
the second price auction tended to generate
higherbidsrelativetotheotherincentivecom-
patible auctions, the degree of inﬂation in-
duced by the second price auction is roughly
consistent across steaks. As a result, when dif-
ferences between bids for steaks are calcu-
lated, the inﬂation is removed. In fact, random
nth price auction bid differences were actually
signiﬁcantly greater than the round 5 second
price auction bid differences. Overall, results
in table 6 indicate that the auction mechanism
can have substantive inﬂuence on bids. This is
especially true for the random nth price auc-
tion and in latter bidding rounds of the second
price auction. That is, the second price auction
yieldedsimilarresultstotheBDMandEnglish
in the ﬁrst round of bidding, but response to
posted market prices generated second priceLusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder Experimental Auction Procedures 401
Table 6. Effect of Auction Institution on WTP: Random Effects Tobit Estimates
Model
No Endowment Endowment Implied
Variable Treatment Treatment Differences
Constant 4.348∗∗ 1.147∗ 0.874∗∗
(0.164)a (0.565) (0.182)
Guaranteed tender 0.840∗∗ ––
(0.081)
Natural 0.457∗ −0.992∗∗ −0.264∗∗
(0.081) (0.173) (0.080)
Choice 1.679∗∗ 0.557∗∗ 0.963∗∗
(0.081) (0.163) (0.075)
CAB 2.094∗∗ 1.350∗∗ 1.419∗∗
(0.081) (0.162) (0.075)
English −1.141∗∗ −1.053∗ 0.371
(0.266) (0.453) (0.502)
BDM −0.551 −1.280∗∗ 0.262
(0.358) (0.493) (0.286)
Random nth—round 1 −1.225∗∗ −1.905∗∗ 0.331∗∗
(0.131) (0.351) (0.140)
Random nth—round 2 −0.997∗∗ −2.148∗∗ 0.447∗∗
(0.131) (0.351) (0.141)
Random nth—round 3 −1.055∗∗ −2.032∗∗ 0.468∗∗
(0.131) (0.349) (0.140)
Random nth—round 4 −1.153∗∗ −2.019∗∗ 0.332∗
(0.131) (0.347) (0.140)
Random nth—round 5 −1.035∗∗ −1.953∗∗ 0.390∗∗
(0.131) (0.346) (0.140)
2nd price—round 1 −1.215∗∗ −1.105∗∗ −0.036
(0.121) (0.274) (0.778)
2nd price—round 2 −0.539∗∗ −0.489 0.123
(0.121) (0.273) (0.128)
2nd price—round 3 −0.300∗ 0.214 0.083
(0.121) (0.272) (0.128)
2nd price—round 4 −0.125 −0.001 0.049
(0.121) (0.274) (0.128)
Gender −0.576∗∗ 0.662∗∗ −0.292∗∗
(0.078) (0.237) (0.081)
Age −0.035∗∗ 0.017∗ −0.007
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
Education 0.210∗∗ −1.357∗∗ −0.269∗∗
(0.074) (0.202) (0.084)
Income 0.139∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.039∗∗
(0.015) (0.027) (0.015)
Student −1.008∗∗ −0.623∗ −0.427∗∗
(0.088) (0.286) (0.100)
Log likelihood −3194.75 −2420.40 −2176.49
Number of observations 1995 1436 1596
∗ and ∗∗ represent 0.05 and 0.01 levels of statistical signiﬁcance, respectively.
aNumbers in parentheses are standard errors.
auctionbidsinexcessoftheBDMandEnglish
bids in latter bidding rounds.
Test for Reference-Dependent Preferences
Table 7 reports random effects tobit models
designedtotestwhetherthesteakendowment
affected valuations. Because the presence or
absence of reference-dependent preferences
could depend on the auction mechanism, we
report separate models for each auction in-
stitution. The ﬁrst column of results suggests
theendowmentsigniﬁcantlyinﬂuencedsecond
price auction bids. The sign of the coefﬁcient,402 May 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
Table 7. Effect of Endowment on WTP: Random Effects Tobit Estimates
Models
Random
Variable 2nd Price nth Price English BDM
Constant −0.826 1.987∗∗ 1.262 1.671
(0.483)a (0.174) (0.802) (1.947)
Natural −0.678∗∗ −0.415∗∗ −0.200 −1.019∗
(0.170) (0.077) (0.266) (0.506)
Choice 0.699∗∗ 0.727∗∗ 1.175∗∗ 1.110
(0.163) (0.072) (0.263) (0.654)
Certiﬁed Angus Beef 1.526∗∗ 1.109∗∗ 1.950∗∗ 1.770∗∗
(0.162) (0.072) (0.276) (0.583)
Endowment treatmentb 1.416∗∗ −0.949∗∗ −0.446 −0.052
(0.237) (0.072) (0.389) (0.804)
Round 1 −0.552∗∗ −0.002 ––
(0.185) (0.081)
Round 2 −0.136 −0.029 ––
(0.184) (0.081)
Round 3 0.163 0.009 ––
(0.184) (0.081)
Round 4 0.033 −0.048 ––
(0.185) (0.082)
Gender 1.113∗∗ −0.631∗∗ 0.131 −2.066∗∗
(0.316) (0.072) (0.357) (0.703)
Age 0.025∗ −0.022∗∗ −0.006 −0.005
(0.012) (0.003) (0.017) (0.036)
Education −0.687∗∗ 0.099 −0.350 0.144
(0.249) (0.066) (0.404) (0.701)
Income 0.176 0.017 −0.031 0.001
(0.036) (0.012) (0.067) (0.121)
Student 0.072 −0.459∗∗ −0.268 −1.039
(0.327) (0.094) (0.490) (1.217)
Log likelihood −2394.78 −1445.84 −316.0 −354.7
Number of observations 1320 1280 212 220
Note: Dependent variable: WTPAi for Endowment treatment and WTPi − WTPA for the No Endowment treatment. ∗ and ∗∗ represent
0.05 and 0.01 levels of statistical signiﬁcance, respectively.
aNumbers in parentheses are standard errors.
bVariable = 1 if WTP from Endowment treatment and 0 if WTP from No Endowment treatment.
however, suggests a counterintuitive result—a
“reverse endowment effect.” This ﬁnding sug-
gests individuals in the second price auction
valued the generic steak less when it was in
their possession as opposed to when they were
simply bidding to obtain it. Although this re-
sult is somewhat counterintuitive, it is not al-
together inconsistent with previous research.
For example, Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler found
that after the ﬁrst three bidding rounds of a
secondpriceauction,willingness-to-acceptfell
below WTP for the remaining bidding rounds
oftheexperiment,aresultconsistentwithare-
verse endowment effect. Consistent with this
ﬁnding, if we segregate our tests for the en-
dowment effect by round (as opposed to one
aggregate effect), we ﬁnd that the endowment
effect becomes more pronounced as auction
round increases.
Results for the random nth price auction
are more consistent with the traditional loss-
aversion theory. For the random nth price auc-
tion, subjects valued the generic steak more
highly when it was in their possession as com-
pared to when they were simply bidding to ob-
tain it. For the English and BDM mechanisms,
the endowment effect was negative, but not
statistically signiﬁcant.
Althoughtheeffectofthesteakendowment
was not consistent across auction mechanism,
this procedural choice can have signiﬁcant in-
ﬂuences on bids. For the random nth price
auction, one would tend to underestimate the
value of a novel good or attribute if an en-
dowmentweregivenrelativetothecasewhere
no endowment were provided. The magnitude
of the coefﬁcients on the endowment effects
are relatively large—the same magnitude asLusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder Experimental Auction Procedures 403
thedummyvariablesforsteaktype,suggesting
that the endowment effect can have important
economic signiﬁcance.
Effect of Number of Goods
Table 8 reports the ﬁnal random effects to-
bitmodelstestingwhethersubjects’valuations
were inﬂuenced by the number of goods in-
cluded in the experiment. Because we ran-
domly drew a binding steak in each treatment,
subjects’ bids should not be inﬂuenced by the
numberofgoodsauctioned,assumingsubjects’
expected utility is linear in probabilities. Re-
sults in table 8 are only partially supportive
of this assumption. The ﬁrst column in table 8
indicates that auction bids were signiﬁcantly
greaterwhenallﬁvesteakswereauctionedver-
susthecasewhereonlythegenericandguaran-
Table 8. EffectofNumberofGoodsonWTP:
Random Effects Tobit Estimates
Implied
Variable Full Bidsa Differencesb
Constant 3.011∗∗ −0.411
(0.272)c (0.329)
Guaranteed tender 0.850∗∗ –
(0.086)
Five goodsd 0.516∗ 0.045
(0.144) (0.147)
Round 1 −1.100∗∗ 0.111
(0.136) (0.142)
Round 2 −0.603∗∗ 0.149
(0.136) (0.142)
Round 3 −0.460∗∗ 0.143
(0.136) (0.142)
Round 4 −0.079 0.187
(0.136) (0.142)
Gender −0.399∗∗ 0.572∗∗
(0.138) (0.154)
Age 0.024∗∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Education −0.474∗∗ −0.355∗∗
(0.139) (0.141)
Income 0.074∗ −0.022
(0.035) (0.027)
Student −1.534∗∗ −0.953∗∗
(0.154) (0.216)
Log likelihood −842.59 −309.05
Number of 550 275
observations 550 275
∗ and ∗∗ represent 0.05 and 0.01 levels of statistical signiﬁcance, respectively.
aThe dependent variable consists of auction bids for the generic and
guaranteed tender steaks.
bThe dependent variable is WTPguaranteed tender – WTPgeneric.
cNumbers in parentheses are standard errors.
dVariable = 1 if WTP from treatment where ﬁve goods were valued and 0 if
WTP from treatment where two goods were valued.
teed tender steaks were auctioned. Although
the result indicates a phenomenon similar to
that observed by List (2002), the magnitude
of the coefﬁcient is relatively small in compar-
ison to the Guaranteed Tender dummy vari-
able and dummy variables identifying auction
round. That is, the result may not be economi-
callysigniﬁcant.Further,itisworthnotingthat,
in contrast to the results previously reported
in tables 6 and 7, the statistical signiﬁcance
of the Five Goods variable is sensitive to in-
clusion/exclusionofthedemographicvariables
such as Student which may indicate problems
withmulticolliniearityandtheneedtoconduct
thistestwithalargersampleofindividuals.The
secondcolumnintable8reportsregressionre-
sultspertainingtothetestofwhetherthenum-
ber of goods auctioned affected the difference
in value between the generic and guaranteed
tender steak. Results indicate that the differ-
encesinsubjects’bidsforthegenericandguar-
anteed tender steaks were uninﬂuenced by
whether the natural, Choice, and CAB steaks
were present.
Conclusions
Despite increased use of experimental auc-
tionstoestimatethevalueofnonmarketgoods,
a number of issues remain unresolved. In par-
ticular, a myriad of different procedures are
being employed without formal consideration
of how the procedure might affect results. This
study analyzed the effect of several proce-
dural issues on valuations from experimental
auctions.
Choice of auction institution signiﬁcantly
(both statistically and economically) inﬂu-
enced bids. Although ﬁrst round second price
auction bids were similar to those produce by
other mechanisms, bids from rounds 2 and
higher in second price auction were signiﬁ-
cantlygreaterthanbidsfromtheothermecha-
nisms.Thesecondpriceauctiongeneratedbids
from20%to300%greaterthanbidsfromran-
dom nth price, BDM, and English auctions.
Relatively high bids in second price auctions
may be due to a variety of factors such as the
failure to incorporate the cost of overbidding,
subjects deriving utility from being the sole
winner, or increased bids due to bidder afﬁlia-
tionandpostingofpricesovermultiplerounds.
Random nth price bids from all ﬁve bidding
roundsweresigniﬁcantly(statisticallyandeco-
nomically) lower than BDM and English bids404 May 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
when subjects were provided an endowment.
Interestingly, the BDM and English price auc-
tions generated statistically equivalent bids
in both the Endowment and No Endowment
treatments. The BDM and English auctions
differ vastly in terms of market involvement
and feedback. In a BDM auction, each sub-
ject essentially bids against a random number
generator, with no competition or feedback
from other subjects. In contrast, the English
auction is structured so every participant is
keenly aware of other bidders and the market
price.
Endowing subjects with a good signiﬁcantly
inﬂuencedvaluations.Consistentwiththeloss-
aversiontheory,providingsubjectswithanen-
dowmentdecreasedtherelativevaluesubjects
placed on nonendowed goods in the random
nth price auction. In contrast, we observed the
opposite case for the second price auction—
subjects valued the generic steak less when it
was in their possession than when they were
bidding on it. It is unclear why the latter re-
sult was obtained, but it is consistent with re-
sults reported by Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler
in the ﬁnal three bidding rounds of their sec-
ond price auctions, indicating the result may
partially be due to the dynamics of the sec-
ond price auction. Providing an endowment
did not signiﬁcant affect bids in English or
BDM auctions. Perhaps one partial explana-
tion why reference-dependent preferences ex-
istedfortherandomnthpriceandsecondprice
auction, but not for the BDM or English is
that both the English and BDM were single-
round, whereas the second and random nth
were multiple-round auctions. Indeed, if we
segregate our tests for the endowment effect
by round for the second price auction, we ﬁnd
that the effect is more pronounced in round 5
thaninround1.Futureresearchmightfocuson
identifying fundamental differences in elicita-
tion mechanisms and auction procedure that
cause individuals to alter the way they view
endowments.
The primary message from this study is that
valuations are not generally invariant to pro-
cedural change. Choice of auction mechanism
andwhethertoendowsubjectswithagoodcan
inﬂuence results and subsequent forecasts and
recommendations.Formostresearchers,itwill
be infeasible to carry out all the comparisons
conducted in this study and one is inescapably
left to choose one particular auction mecha-
nism and one particular procedure. Although
thisconstraintisrestrictive,thisstudyprovides
some insight as to how results might vary if an
alternative choice had been made.
[Received November 2002;
accepted July 2003.]
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